"Create an environment that protects women, rather than selling anxiety!": Participatory Threat Modeling with Chinese Young Women Living Alone

As more young women in China live alone, they navigate entangled privacy, security, and safety (PSS) risks across smart homes, online platforms, and public infrastructures. Drawing on six participatory threat modeling (PTM) workshops (n = 33), we present a human-centered threat model that illustrates how digitally facilitated physical violence, digital harassment and scams, and pervasive surveillance by individuals, companies, and the state are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. We also document four mitigation strategies employed by participants: smart home device configurations, boundary management, sociocultural practices, and social media tactics–each of which can introduce new vulnerabilities and emotional burdens. Based on these insights, we developed a digital PSS guidebook for young women living alone (YWLA) in China. We further propose actionable design implications for smart home devices and social media platforms, along with policy and legal recommendations and directions for educational interventions.

💡 Research Summary

This paper investigates the privacy, security, and safety (PSS) challenges faced by Chinese young women living alone (YWLA), a rapidly growing demographic of roughly 40 million individuals. Using six participatory threat modeling (PTM) workshops with 33 participants across several major Chinese cities, the authors let the women themselves define, map, and reflect on the threats they encounter in smart homes, online platforms, and public infrastructure.

The analysis reveals three inter‑related threat domains: (1) digitally‑facilitated physical violence, where service workers such as delivery drivers or cleaners gain or could gain access to the home through smart‑lock or camera vulnerabilities; (2) digital harassment and scams, especially deep‑fake‑based extortion targeting the women or their families; and (3) pervasive surveillance spanning hidden cameras, biometric data collection, and state‑level monitoring. These domains reinforce each other—for example, a compromised smart‑camera can enable both a physical intrusion and a blackmail scheme.

Participants employ four primary mitigation strategies. First, they configure smart‑home devices (dual‑factor authentication, camera‑field restriction, encrypted cloud storage) to act as “digital guardians.” Second, they practice boundary management, verifying the identity of male service providers and limiting in‑person contact. Third, they draw on traditional cultural practices (e.g., feng‑shui rituals) for psychological comfort, though these have limited technical impact. Fourth, they use social‑media tactics, sharing warnings in online communities, seeking emotional support, and leveraging platform reporting tools. Each strategy, however, introduces new vulnerabilities: complex device settings can be misconfigured; boundary work can reinforce patriarchal expectations; and algorithmically amplified fear‑mongering content on social media can increase anxiety.

From these findings the authors produce an open‑access PSS guidebook tailored to YWLA and propose concrete design, policy, and educational interventions. Design recommendations for smart‑home manufacturers include privacy‑by‑default defaults, intuitive permission‑management interfaces, and real‑time risk alerts. Recommendations for social‑media platforms call for gender‑aware danger notifications, transparent reporting/appeal mechanisms, and algorithmic adjustments to curb fear‑inducing content. Policy suggestions encompass clearer legal definitions and harsher penalties for gender‑based digital abuse, stronger data‑protection regulations, and mandatory gender‑sensitivity training for law‑enforcement personnel.

The paper’s contributions are threefold: (1) it adapts participatory threat modeling to a non‑Western, Chinese sociotechnical context, foregrounding lived experiences and emotional responses; (2) it constructs a human‑centered threat model that links smart‑home technology, digital harassment, and multi‑scalar surveillance into a mutually reinforcing system; and (3) it highlights the “mitigation paradox” where protective practices can generate additional risks, urging designers and policymakers to shift responsibility from individuals to the broader ecosystem. Limitations include a sample biased toward urban, educated women and the lack of longitudinal evaluation of the guidebook’s effectiveness. Future work should broaden demographic coverage and measure long‑term changes in perceived safety and actual incident rates.