The Moroccan Public Procurement Game

In this paper, we study the public procurement market through the lens of game theory by modeling it as a strategic game with discontinuous and non-quasiconcave payoffs. We first show that the game admits no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We then analyze the two-player case and derive two explicit mixed-strategy equilibria for the symmetric game and for the weighted $(p,1-p)$ formulation. Finally, we study the existence of a symmetric mixed strategies Nash equilibrium in the general $N$-player case by applying the diagonal disjoint payoff matching condition.

💡 Research Summary

The paper “The Moroccan Public Procurement Game” offers a rigorous game‑theoretic treatment of the public procurement reforms introduced in Morocco in 2023. The author models the procurement process as a strategic game in which each bidder chooses a bid (x_i) from a closed interval (